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Vortex of a Regional Security Complex: 
The EuroMed Partnership and its Security Relevance
♦ 
 
Astrid B. Boening
♣ 
 
Introduction 
 
Studying the Mediterranean as a geo-political region, Pace (2003, 161) states that “the study of 
regions must in some way include the study of meaning and identity”. Other authors, such as 
Shamsaddin Megalommatis (2007) are of the opinion that, pertaining to the Arabic and Islamic 
neighbors of the EU, only Turkey and Iran matter at all.  
        In this paper I seek to assess security-related dynamics in the EuroMed Partnership (EMP). 
To re-think the Mediterranean region (Euro-Med) in a relational, political context, Pace (2003, 
161) suggests focusing on agency and structure in the analysis of the “processual” (emphasis 
mine) aspects of region making. This paper focuses on the Euro-Mediterranean region and the 
role of the European Union (EU) and its southern Mediterranean neighbors in “constructing” this 
space, and hereby giving it meaning, as well as potentially leading to reciprocal “re-construction” 
of their self-identity in the context of a potential Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex 
(EMRSC). This would contrast with the Middle Eastern Regional Security Complex (MERSC) 
which Buzan and Waever (2003) had suggested, but rather this paper suggests a slight theoretical 
shift to Buzan and Waever’s Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). 
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         In terms of security relevance of this topic, when approaching MENA from the geo-political 
perspective of Iraq today (not to mention Iran), the instability in these countries has only added to 
existing instabilities in the Middle East, such as apparently fuelling Syria’s alleged activism in 
Lebanon, and the Palestine-Israeli conflict becoming exacerbated by further inflamed Islam 
fundamentalism and militancy. Against these millennia-old instabilities of the Euro-
Mediterranean region, and the prospect of increased terrorism in the Magreb and the Mashriq, and 
its spill-over to neighboring countries and regions, I examine the role of the EuroMed Partnership 
(EMP) for its potential to contribute to regional stabilization and development to compensate for 
the intra-regional struggles for political influence by e.g. extremist non-state actors as well as 
state-sponsored terrorism.  
        The Euro-Mediterranean as a Regional Security Complex would also be a way to address the 
inter-regional demarcations highlighted by some authors (compare Haass 2006) beyond 
economics or cultural rapprochement in terms of the synergy between the different security 
sectors Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) have identified in terms of regional security complex 
theory, such as environmental security, human security, energy security, and of course of classic 
military security. Other authors (compare Christiansen, Petito and Tonra 2000) would forge the 
role of the EMP in a political and ideational collective identity, rather than letting the countries 
bordering the Mediterranean to develop even greater fault lines among them.  
         The writing of this paper coincided with the evolution of the Union for the Mediterranean  
(UMed) from the original French proposal for a Mediterranean Union by Sarkozy during 2007 
and early 2008; so the writing of this paper about the EMP represented a “moving target” and 
“EMP” will not unlikely have to be replaced with “UMed” sooner than later. Traynor (2008, 2) 
writes that it is to be hoped that the UMed, upon its official “debut” at the French EU summit in 
July 2008, will contribute not only to “pushing the Mediterranean issue up the EU agenda”, but 
also to streamline the EU’s Mediterranean policy which some authors had referred to as being 
“impaired by a guerilla war among the EU institutions over the allocation of competencies” 
(Philippart 2001, 124 quoted in Schumacher 2005, 374).  
        Until  the  official  “inauguration”  of the UMed, this paper cannot make predictions or 
declarations in what relationship it stand to the EMP. While the UMed’s original announcements 
lead one to believe that it represents the successor paradigm to the EMP, to paraphrase Mark 
Twain, a premature declaration of the Barcelona Process as dead is at the time of writing this 
article not yet appropriate. 
 
 
  4  5
A Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex Structure? 
 
EMP-member states, in addition to their shared history and geographical space, and through their 
formal inter-linkage of the “three-basked”-parameters”
1 of the Barcelona Process per se are also 
formally linked beyond mere diplomatic and foreign policy ties through a complex structure of 
“formal” hard and soft security ties, including conflict resolution, anchored on the part of the EU 
in a “thickening” institutionalization of its governing bodies, i.e. the Council, the Commission 
and the Parliament to a degree.  
 
The Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defense Policy 
 
Beyond the three-basket parameters of the EMP, I also consider positioning the EMRSC i.a. 
within the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and potentially with the European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). With the end of the Cold War, the EC recognized “the 
transition to a new European order as a positive opportunity to develop its external role” (Pace 
2003, 164). With the establishment of the CFSP as part of the Maastricht Treaty a renewed 
Mediterranean Policy was introduced in December 1990. The CFSP was enhanced by significant 
changes introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 with the establishment of the Common 
European Security and Defense Policy (C)(ESDP) to “safeguard the common values, fundamental 
interests, independence and integrity of the Union” (European Commission website 2008 CFSP), 
promote international cooperation and development, consolidate democracy and the rule of law,  
                                                           
    
1 These are: a) The political and security partnership with the aim of strengthening the political dialogue is based 
on “observance of essential principles of international law, and to reaffirm common objectives in matters of internal 
and external stability” (EU Commission website 2006: Barcelona Declaration). EMP partners agreed to act in 
accordance with the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (such as guaranteeing “the effective 
legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms, including freedom of expression, freedom of association for peaceful 
purposes and freedom of thought, conscience and religion, both individually and together with other members of the 
same group, without any discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, language, religion or sex”(EU Commission 
website 2006: Barcelona Declaration) as well as other obligations under international law, including their regional and 
international agreements.   
       b)  As both Abdullahtif Ahmida (2000) and Joffé (2001, 34) point out, already the 1957 Treaty of Rome made 
specific provisions for the economic relationship between the Maghrib and the EC. However, while these were based 
stronger on colonial patters of the former as a raw material and labor supply, and market for EC/EU goods, the 
economic aspect of the EMP is directed towards economic development in MENA to reduce the gap between the 
northern and the southern periphery of the Mediterranean. 
       c)  Some writers view the social-cultural “basket” of the EMP as “mainly aspirational in nature…, primarily 
devoted to supporting the growth of civil society in the South” (Joffé 2001, 38), while the EMP’s documents also 
indicate plans to develop human resources and to promote understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil 
societies (e.g. European Commission 2000, 2006, 2007), aims which have been substantially supported in turning them 
into reality by NGOs such as the Anna Lindh Foundation. The EMP participants recognize that the traditions of culture 
and civilization throughout the Mediterranean region, the dialogue between these cultures and exchanges at the human, 
scientific and technological levels are essential factors in bringing their peoples closer by promoting understanding 
between them and improving their perception of each other. 
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as well as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Ibid.) by i.a. adopting joint actions 
and common positions and strategies. Nevertheless, the EU still had not adopted long-term 
policies to address the increasing disparities between the two sides of the Mediterranean (Pace 
2003, 164). Pending the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, a new post of High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (superseding the High Representative for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy) will be instituted (rather than an EU “foreign minister”, as 
the failed Constitutional Treaty had foreseen). 
        The CFSP is augmented by the work of the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC) in 
Torrejón de Ardoz, Spain, to produce information derived from space imagery of the earth, the 
European Union Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Paris to contribute to the creation of a 
common European security culture and support the strategic debate (EU commission website 
security agencies 2008), as well as the European Defence Agency (EDA) in Brussels to develop a 
comprehensive approach in defining the needs and anticipated restructuring of the ESDP 
specifically (Ibid.). 
        The recognition that no European country can tackle today’s complex security challenges 
alone led in December 2001 to the adoption of a declaration on the operational capability of the 
European Security and Defense Policy (European Commission CFSP 2008) by the European 
Council at Laeken, recognizing the EU’s capability – and responsibility – to conduct some crisis 
management operations. This expansion of cooperation and harmonization in the EU’s foreign 
policy and defense with member states’ policies is shared in Brussels by the Commission, the 
Council and to an extent by the European Parliament which is consulted on budgetary matters. 
The first concrete steps of the ESDP were to outline existing capabilities (in the Helsinki 
Headline Goal) for implementation of the Petersberg Declaration.  
         It must be noted that the institutional shifts within the EU in the meantime, such as with 
respect to the integration of the Western European Union, which had been actively involved in 
these tasks (in close cooperation with NATO as well as their Partnership for Peace, involving the 
former Soviet States), added unavoidable delays and led to a new timetable to be set in the 
“Headline Goal 2010”. It is against the background of this shifting foreign and security policy 
environment that the next section will expand specifically on the EU’s foreign policy relating to 
those states neighboring the EU to the south. 
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The European Neighborhood Policy  
 
The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), of which the EMP is a part, was founded nearly ten 
years after the EMP itself. The EMP’s origins are multilateral beyond the EU, as they can be 
traced to initiatives by US President Bush and USSR President Gorbachev, who had sent an 
invitation for a peace conference on October 30, 1991 in Madrid to the governments of Israel, 
Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, the Palestinians (as part of the Jordanese delegation), Egypt, the 
European Community, and the Gulf Cooperation Council and the UN as observers (Israel 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs website “Madrid Letter”) in order to take advantage of the 
opportunity for reshaping the basic political order in the Middle East following the breakup of the 
Soviet Union and the “Second Gulf War” (Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait) (Boening  2007d, 2/3). The 
EMP’s mandate is based on the political, economic and culturally strategic significance of the 
Mediterranean region to the EU, and seeks to develop a relationship between its partners based on 
“comprehensive cooperation and solidarity, in keeping with the privileged nature of the links 
forged by neighbourhood and history” (EU Commission website 2006: Barcelona declaration). 
       The  ENP  overall  “remains  a  core  priority of the EU’s foreign policy” (ENP Presidency 
Progress Report 2007). It does not provide an accession prospect (nor does it prejudice a later 
membership application) for its members, but seeks to strengthen security and stability by 
reinforcing bilateral relations, including a significant degree of integration, and seeks to 
encourage human rights, the rule of law and good governance. The ENP is bilaterally based 
between the EU and the neighborhood countries
2, to facilitate each individualized progress and 
integration, while working to avoid new dividing lines, but enhance the “privileged relationship, 
building upon a mutual commitment to common values (democracy and human rights, rule of 
law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development)” (EU 
Commission website 3/12/2008). The added value of the ENP to the EU’s neighborhood are a. 
    an  enhanced  and  more  focused  policy approach of the EU towards its 
neighborhood… [b] the perspective of moving beyond cooperation to a 
significant degree of integration… [c] the ENP will upgrade the scope and 
intensity of political cooperation with partner countries (EU Commission 
Strategy Paper 2004), 8). 
 
         There are a  multitude of considerations for Europe’s engagement in MENA. The EMP 
constitutes the EU’s main multilateral foreign policy instrument (as part of the ENP) in the 
                                                           
     
2  The EU’s goal to integrate Libya towards full membership in the EMP is proceeding slowly and has not been fully 
achieved nor has an association agreement even been signed yet at the time of writing this article. 
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Middle East and sub-Saharan and North Africa (MENA)
3. Security in many forms of course has 
been front page news in this region for 3000 years, with its mystical beginnings in the Trojan 
Wars, and are catapulted to even higher priority almost daily for a number of reasons. Beyond the 
security implications of the economic disparities within MENA and the EU, and terrorist attacks 
such as in Madrid, indirect issues arise also e.g. in societal security e.g. when thousands of mostly 
economic refugees leave North Africa continually on a dangerous Atlantic and Mediterranean 
crossing to EU territory, such as (often via the Canary Islands) to Gibraltar or Italy. While this 
journey results in numerous fatalities among the refugees due to the treacherous transportation 
devices used, the arrival of the refugees in the EU represents a problem in terms of illegal and 
undocumented immigration at a time of increased border security world wide, and also forces the 
EU to undertake expensive repatriation to the sometimes uncooperative countries of origin. 
               MENA member states often view the EMP “as a series of ‘irreversible’ and ‘strategic’ 
choices that are seen as prerequisites for the necessary liberalization of … [some] econom[ies]” 
(Thiele et al. 2005, 65), and is favored on occasion  because it is not predominated by a 
hegemon
4, such as the U.S. Nevertheless, many MENA EMP members consider soft security and 
developmental policies as insufficient to deal with international threats, and are very interested in 
assistance to carry out policing and security tasks effectively, such as having technical equipment 
and training made available to them more readily through e.g. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue 
(Ibid., 66). 
 
The Union for the Mediterranean  
 
The recently agreed upon EU’s Union for the Mediterranean appears to have evolved from the 
suspiciously French neo-colonial sounding original proposal for a Mediterranean Union (Barber 
2008). It is now an approach anticipated for a re-invigoration of the Barcelona Process
5, as 
Dependencia-objections by some to the originally proposed Mediterranean Union gave way to the 
compromise agreement worked out among all EU member state. This Union for the 
Mediterranean’s is hoped not to distract from, or dilute the potential cohesion, solidarity and 
                                                           
     
3 Although the relations between the EU and individual MENA countries are predominantly based on bilateral 
agreements (“action plans”) today. Additionally, although the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy is presented 
externally as unified, EU member countries, especially those on the EU’s southern shore, continue to maintain bilateral 
diplomatic and economic relationships with MENA countries. 
     
4 i.e. in keeping the term “hegemon” in a state-context. In “neo-“ or “post- Westphalian” terms the EU itself could of 
course be viewed hegemonically. 
     
5 upon its official debut in July 2008 as mentioned above. Since the final details of the UMed are not know today, it 
is not possible at the time of this writing to definitively state whether the Barcelona Process received a “face-lift” with 
the UMed, or whether  
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concerted socio-political evolution between the EU and Arab countries by not adding more 
bureaucratic layers without true identification with, or shared values and visions, beyond 
Sarkozy’s original fantasy of guaranteeing France and French (especially energy) companies a 
privileged position vis-à-vis the Southern Mediterranean, to the exclusion of other Southern 
European countries, and most certainly the EU’s commitments overall. The reassertion of pooled 
sovereignty and harmonized positions within the EU on the occasion of the UMed agreement also 
represents an important confirmation of the CFSP as representing all EU member states, rather 
than yielding to the re-emergence of split European colonial spheres of influence in its 
Neighborhood (Hall and Benoit 2008): an important example for non-EU EMP member states 
who are still unsure of supra-national mechanisms in regional integration. 
        In the meantime, the EMP’s goal of a Free Trade Zone by 2010 remains a priority for the 
Union of the Mediterranean, as well as the continued interest in energy security, Mediterranean 
Sea pollution control, Mediterranean maritime security in light of human and material trafficking 
in conjunction with the  continued expansion of civil security cooperation, the expansion of the 
Erasmus exchange program to students of Southern Mediterranean partner countries, as well as a 
new emphasis on scientific epistemic communities pioneered by Peter Haas in this area already 
several decades ago (EurActiv 14 March, 2008). In this way the UMed will re-invigorate the 
Mediterranean region and contribute to a strengthening of the political, economic and socio-
cultural security dynamics inherent in this Regional Security Complex. Only this approach will 
avoid the “divide and conquer” approach of Sarkozy’s original proposal for a Mediterranean 
Union, which sought to exclude and create a “second tier” degradation for the Southern neighbors 
from their current neighborhood-status (Khader 2008). At the moment, the UMed represents more 
of a “plus ca change, plus c’est pareil” in terms of goals, with the institutionalization yet to be 
sorted out, and the question of a possible expansion to include Croatia, Montenegro, Albania and 
Bosnia not yet answered (Emerson 2008), but plausible. One hopes that EU procedures will 
become simplified rather than turn into more muddled, complex overlays. 
 
NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue 
 
In comparison, NATO’s mandate also shifted post-Cold War from defending a clearly delimited 
territory to a new strategy of committing member states to defend  
      unbounded interests beyond Europe’s theater of operations: NATO’s new mandate 
is as global as the Western interests it has pledged to defend … [implying] that the Arab 
world will received its fair share of NATO attention … [such as] crisis operations … to 
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keep risks at a distance by dealing with potential crises (which could affect Euro-
Atlantic stability) at an early stage (El-Gawhary 1999, 16/7). 
 
NATO changed post-Cold War from that of a collective defense organization to a collective 
security organization, seeking to avoid new polarizations and the creation of new dividing lines 
between formers friends and foes, but to seek cooperation between former adversaries through 
integration in Allied progress, e.g. Partnership for Peace (PfP) and special relationships as 
mechanisms for exporting stability to new member countries. 
         NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative specifically was formally launched in December 1994 as 
the “Mediterranean Dialogue” (“Dialogue”), reflecting the alliance’s recognition of the 
Mediterranean’s unique regional security challenges. The Dialogue was also intended to reach out 
to non-NATO member countries who might be interested in collaborating with NATO’s 
Mediterranean security and stability projects. These “partners” would not be allies at the 
beginning but would be involved in confidence building programs, to become members when 
some major qualifications were met, e.g. irreversible commitments to democracy, civilian control 
of the military and development of a nation’s military capability to a level of interoperability with 
those of NATO members” (Kaplan 1999, 195). 
        The “soft” power ideas and programs of the EMP/UMed to co-constitute structures for peace 
hence would be balanced in an EMRSC e.g. with NATO’s Article 5 mission: “Security is 
indivisible within the Euro-Atlantic region”
6 as a pact against war (Yost 1998, 6) as well as the 
(now favored) non-Article 5 missions of collective security of an alliance to “deter, and if 
necessary defend, against one or more identifiable external threats”. This goes back to the 
Wilsonian conviction that collective security is an international morality superior to that on which 
the realist balance of power system is based (Yost 1998, 8) – and it has always been understood 
that NATO would not undertake a mission without UN Security Council approval (especially 
after the U.S. overcame this restraint on national action with the invasion of Iraq with limited 
success at the time of this writing, partially due to this unilateralism). 
 
Conclusions 
 
The EMP’s specific mandate is based on the political, economic and culturally strategic 
significance of the Mediterranean region to the European Union (EU) and seeks to develop a 
relationship between its partners based on “comprehensive cooperation and solidarity, in keeping 
                                                           
      
6  Comparable to the theme of the League of Nations that “peace is indivisible” 
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with the privileged nature of the links forged by neighbourhood and history” (EU Commission 
website 2006: Barcelona Declaration). This reflects dynamics of a security community. 
 
From Security Community to Regional Security Complex? 
 
Reverting from this hard/soft power constellation in the Mediterranean, I return to Buzan (1991, 
190, quoted in Pace 2003, 166) introduced – and contrasts between - the concept of a security 
community and a security complex theory. Security community, according to Buzan (1991, 218) 
represents the far end on the scale of security interdependence, wherein “disputes among all the 
members are resolved to such an extent that none fears… either political assault or military 
position on his continuum security configurations, related to the idea of a ‘security community’”. 
A security complex represents “a group of states whose primary security concerns are linked 
together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart 
from one another (Buzan 1991, 190, quoted in Pace 2003, 166). 
         While NATO remains committed to Europe, the CFSP continues to evidence incidents of 
dis-harmony, especially with a downgrading of the commitment to unity in favor of nationalist 
impulses in the Lisbon Treaty. To what extent this will affect the ESDP remains to be seen. 
Additionally, the European NATO-members’ hesitations in Afghanistan (Schreer and Toje 2008) 
raise some questions about the EU’s ability to coordinate the ESDP with NATO (in line with M. 
Albright’s “Three D’s”: no decoupling of NATO from Europe, no duplication of efforts, no 
discrimination against non-EU members, such as Turkey). Let us hope that the Union for the 
Mediterranean will be a fresh breath to strengthen the Euro-Mediterranean region for the security 
challenges which Europe, the Arab nations bordering the Mediterranean and, via the transatlantic 
umbilicus, North America, face as a region as well as inter- and intra-regionally in all a security 
sectors, from the political, the economic to the socio-cultural in the future, as security is, in fact, 
largely indivisible especially in the Euro-Mediterranean region despite the political-cultural 
variations to it among EMP members. 
       While some authors are pessimistic about the role of the EMP in the regional integration of 
the Euro-Mediterranean region, such as Christiansen, Petito and Tonra (2000, 401), who write 
that 
      while  shared  geographic  and  climatic conditions have shaped regional 
cultures and peoples – what the French historian Braudel has termed the 
common ‘material culture’ of the Mediterranean Civilization – they have 
failed to forge any significant degree of political or ideational collective 
identity [due] … to the complex and conflicting geopolitical history of the 
area. 
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The Mediterranean region is an example of the interplay between 
    the destabilizing consequences of uneven economic development in states 
lacking democratic accountability as a sub-state-problem, and the trans-
national links of organized criminal networks engaged in trafficking people, 
drugs and arms as a supranational problem (Spencer 2001, 12), 
 
and the development of a common security identity overshadowed by the breakdown of the 
Middle East peace process, most recently by the Palestinian intifada of 2000 and its aftermath of 
accelerated Muslim militancy. 
 
ESDP 
NATO
/Med 
Dialog
EMP/
UMed 
CFSP 
 
Fig. 1: Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security (Super) Complex (copyright Astrid Boening 2007) 
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        It is in this context of socio-political shifts that opportunities for new perspectives in the 
CFSP, especially with respect to the ENP, arise. Klotz and Lynch (2007, 3) write: 
 
     The  end  of  the  Cold  War  shattered stable antagonisms and alliances… This 
destabilization widened the political and intellectual spaces - and increased the need – 
for scholars to ask questions about the cultural bases of conflict, alternative conceptions 
of national identity, [and] the ethics of intervention… Individuals and groups are not 
only shaped by their world but can also change it. People can … set into motion new 
normative, cultural, economic, social, or political practices that alter conventional 
wisdoms and standard operating procedures. 
 
      Hence I maintain that the EMP (in conjunction with, or in its new “edition” as the UMed
7) as 
the soft-power manifestation of the EU’s ENP nevertheless also incorporates the hard-power 
potential of the ESDP, backed, as the EU has since its inception, by NATO, and in this case 
specifically, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue. Hence the EMP embodies a strategic significance 
– and wide-reaching opportunity - in terms of a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex. 
This can, in Buzan and Weaver’s (2003) terminology, be extended transatlantically to include 
North America (as NATO partners), and the U.S. in particular, into a Regional Security Super 
Complex. 
       This analysis of course gained prominence following the emergence of the European Security 
and Defence Policy (ESDP) of 1999 and “the need to examine the security and defence 
dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership” (Heisbourg 2001, 5). The role of the EU in the 
EMP, however, is so far one of predominant and significant soft power in all the security sectors 
identified by Buzan et al. (1998)
8  - sectors, which  are also reflected in the EU’s CFSP.  I argue 
in this paper that the processes, e.g. norming, complex social learning, complex (post-
hegemonic?) interdependence, agent-structure co-constitution of identities and interests within the 
“three-basket”- paradigm of the EMP contribute to the development of a regional security 
complex identity in the Mediterranean (which would deviate from Buzan and Waever’s (2003) 
suggestion of a Middle Eastern regional security complex). Hypothetically, part of the 
significance of this would be an extrapolation of these vestiges of a Euro-Med international 
society (per English School theorists) forming from the current international system in this 
region.  
        This paper then argues that in order to transcend millennia of clashes, we should explore the 
possibility of changing the assumptions about peace in the Mediterranean definition of security to 
                                                           
     
7 in light of  the little which is known about it specifically at this time  
      
8 With NATO’s Mediterranean Alliance addressing hard security issues under a large number of partnership-
building programs 
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identify post-structural, sub- and supra-state agents (such as terrorist groups, NGOs and of course 
the post-Westphalian EU) post-Cold War. Although the tradition referent object in matters of war 
and peace has been the state, its centrality is questioned as criteria like the mutual co-constitution 
of interests, identities, agency and structure of the individual or society have been identified as 
decisive in the security community discourse (Bicchi 2001, 2). Bicchi (2001) also favors a 
constructivist approaches to the European security concept: rather than the existence of a 
“natural” threat, we need to examine instead how security and the security threat were 
constructed through discourse and practice (Adler and Barnett 1998), such as the importance of 
language and the definition of security. For example, does “threat” emphasize the existence of a 
“real” threat which underlines aggregate power, proximity, capability (these three factors being 
objective), and offensive intentions (relating to mutual understandings and communications, 
whereby a threat does not exist unless it was perceived as a threat) (Wolfers 1962). Whether this 
process leading to a new “we” will be successful – or has to be successful in light of the bigger 
extra-regional challenges – will to some degree be potentially continue to be affected by the 
Israeli-Palestinian dilemma. A solution for this may have to be jumpstarted by the U.S. again, 
possibly after the presidential elections at the end of the year and its effect on the U.S.’ own 
Broader Middle East and Africa Initiative. 
       In any case, the EMP/UMed are a manifestation of what van Langenhove (2008) has termed 
not a post-Westphalian world order, but a neo-Westphalian world order:  
   The old world of states has made positive developments in governance, but 
has also created what Nobel rize-winning economist Amartya Sen called an 
illusion of destiny that has resulted in incredible violence. The multiple world 
of regions could be a way to replace the illusion of a single national identity 
with the more realist view that people hold plural regional identities. As such, 
the world of regions might not only be a more complex world but also one 
with more chances of peace and freedom. (van Langenhove 2008, 15). 
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